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Using radical embodied cognitive science, the paper offers the hypothesis that language
is symbiotic: its agent-environment dynamics arise as linguistic embodiment is managed
under verbal constraints. As a result, co-action grants human agents the ability to
use a unique form of phenomenal experience. In defense of the hypothesis, I stress
how linguistic embodiment enacts thinking: accordingly, I present auditory and acoustic
evidence from 750ms of mother-daughter talk, first, in fine detail and, then, in narrative
mode. As the parties attune, they use a dynamic field to co-embody speech with
experience of wordings. The latter arise in making and tracking phonetic gestures that,
crucially, mesh use of artifice, cultural products and impersonal experience. As observers,
living human beings gain dispositions to display and use social subjectivity. Far from
using brains to “process” verbal content, linguistic symbiosis grants access to diachronic
resources. On this distributed-ecological view, language can thus be redefined as: “activity
in which wordings play a part.”
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psychology, enactivism, distributed language
“The important issue is not where cognitive processing begins and
ends.”
(Vallée-Tourangeau and Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014).
INTRODUCTION
Since it is beyond debate that living systems depend on
metabolism, it can seem trivially true that cognitive activity
draws on embodiment. To block any such view, the paper turns
to how metabolism functions as “cognition emerges in ecolog-
ical space and ecological time from the interactions of brain
activity, motor actions, and artifacts” (Vallée-Tourangeau and
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). In examining coordination in a multi-
scalar ecology, it pursues Chemero’s (2009) thesis that agent-
environment dynamics ground all cognitive activity. In language,
representation is replaced by emphasis on how persons con-
cert activity or, simply, come to act as observers1. The resulting
skills underpin the paper’s thesis: language is activity based on
symbiotic control of bodily movements that are perceived as
“wordings.” Given phenomenal experience of iterated patterns,
understanding connects the subjective to the impersonal or, alter-
natively, linguistic embodiment falls under partial control of a
community’s verbal constraints. Humans thus live in social mesh-
works of families, groups, communities, and even nations—each
with characteristic ways of using linguistic embodiment.
While all embrained species interlace action and perception, in
human groups, some of the time, and to some extent, people use
“self-directed” “representational acts,” mimetic forms of activity
1People do not just engage with the world: they also treat what they perceive
and how they act as making sense and/or meaningful (e.g., Maturana and
Varela, 1994).
that emerged millions of years before language (Donald, 1991).
They arise under the control of one or more persons and con-
tribute much to a community’s forms of life. Ways of embody-
ing mimetic performance appear in knapping flint, kicking a
ball around, dancing, or taking part in talk. In each kind of
activity, the results connect a human lineage with histories of
individuals, relationships and ways of exploiting cultural com-
plexity. Crucially, they link local and situated events to the
products of a group’s history. Unlike other primates, humans
use extended cognitive systems. People draw on the past to
alter later behavior: lived experience is enriched by using arti-
fice and language to connect up the scales of time. Both dis-
tributed (Hutchins, 1995, 2014) and systemic (Cowley and Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2013) approaches stress the multi-scalar nature of
human cognition.
Culture enables people to tackle tasks by using structures
that criss-cross temporal dimensions. A classic case is that of
equipment that is designed to create images from deep-space
(Giere, 2004). Human-technology aggregates enable the Hubble,
for example, to connect the slow scales of physical evolution with
the rapidity of light and mid-scales of embodiment and observa-
tion. In Giere’s terms, distributed systems link artifacts, measuring,
and the doings of human individuals. In spite of supra-individual
complexity, the Hubble was made by and for observers. This is
necessary to distributed systems: they depend on persons who
use resources, including languages, to interpret what is per-
ceived. Observers connect embodied measures with verbal skills
to animate systems whose temporal scope reaches beyond lived
experience. In what follows, this perspective is applied to human
language-derived skills. Bodily synergies enable people to track
and construe vocal movements: however, linguistic embodiment
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is also run through with affect. As people cooperate, compete, and
otherwise coordinate, they set off nonce events that will be called
wordings2. These phenomena arise as speech gestures constrain
other aspects of linguistic embodiment. Crucially, they shape a
richer phenomenal field: wordings co-occur with visible behavior
and resonances as the vocal folds modulate the flow of air through
changing vocal tracts.
People link linguistic embodiment with verbal and discursive
patterns as they animate distributed systems. They do so both
unthinkingly and as actors. While reiterating speech patterns,
context can be used to attribute properties to so-called “words.”
Eschewing appeal to representation or content, I thus liken the
concept of language to the concept of mind. As proposed by Ryle
(1949), I explain belief in mind and language without appealing
to linguistic or mental systems “in the head.” Rather than posit
dependence on neural dispositions, however, I stress the meshing
of living embodiment with phenomenal experience. As a result it
is possible to hypothesize that language is symbiotic: the phenom-
enal field is influenced, in part, by how people make and track
phonetic gestures. By tracing the verbal to the phenomenal the
paper rejects the code-metaphor 3. or, in other terms, the view that
“inner” systems process, generate or produce linguistic forms.
Rather, embodiment links phenomenal experience to verbal pat-
terns as, during ontogenesis, humans become actor-observers. In
so doing, speaking and cooperating come under a degree of col-
lective control. People gain skills in using a multi-scalar linguistic
resource that allows embodiment to evoke impersonal products
as people manage later events (cf. Hollan et al., 2000).
Since language is distributed across space and time, much can
be learned from examining whole-body expression. To natural-
ize linguistic experience, one can thus begin with how bodily
dynamics take on a verbal aspect. For, on this view, language arises
as people coordinate and interpret events by linking movement
with experience (Cowley, 2011b); the verbal is secondary and
derived. In distributed terms, human cognition links interactiv-
ity (Cowley and Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013; Steffensen, 2013) with
the normative sense-saturated flow of experience. Just as people
learn to identify objects, events and situations, they learn to per-
ceive reiterating phenomenal patterns, or wordings. As unique
events, their sense results from experience with how a commu-
nity uses phonetic gestures—events are heard against types that
shape belief in words and languages. Humans become observers
2The paper builds on the Browman and Goldstein’s (1992) articulatory
phonology in that the verbal aspect of speech is traced to how people make
and track phonetic gestures (based on timing of articulatory movements in
a moving vocal tract). Not only is there massive support for the view (see
Fowler, 2010) but it abolishes mental representation. More controversially, I
treat this as compatible with Port’s (2010) demonstration that people use rich
phonetic memory –a single utterance-act evokes many phonetic exemplars.
Given the ecological basis of such views, the paper’s perspective is deemed
distributed-ecological.
3Appeal to the code view is shorthand for reducing linguistic activity to the
systematic use of linguistic forms (whether cashed out in behaviorist or cogni-
tivist terms). Variations on the negative argument are set out in Harris (1981);
Linell (2005); Love (2004), and Kravchenko (2007). Interactivism offers a
related perspective that derives from the context of cognitive science (see
Bickhard, 2009).
by learning to hear and articulate wordings. Once these are used
to inform coordination, linguistic embodiment can shape activity
around cultural goals and tasks. As a result, language is necessarily
symbiotic. First, as emphasized below, linguistic embodiment is
affective experience or a flow of direct meaning making. Second,
its phenomenal aspect links phonetic gestures to wordings that
allow descriptions of what linguists usually call language. Given
a strange duality, language extends experience as people manage
actions that are described by, but do not reduce to, the working
of linguistic form and semantic content. The duality of word-
ings and coordinated action allows human cognition to reach
far beyond the body. This is because, in concerting across time,
people mesh verbal patterns with skillful action. Language has
a multi-scalar heterogeneity akin to that of music, pottery or
scientific practice. Humans exploit the scales of time as people
who co-opt and transform material and biological structures. As
a result, a global meshwork constrains activity in a staggeringly
complex social world.
BRIEF OVERVIEW
My hypothesis is that linguistic embodiment and verbal con-
straints are symbiotic. Taking a distributed-ecological view,
emphasis falls on, not linguistic forms (or content), but how
cognitive resources are put to use in managing temporal experi-
ence. First, language is traced to the rapid or pico-scale dynamics
that dominate linguistic embodiment: as shown below, it enacts
measurable and observable bodily events. Second, parties are
shown to use phonetic gestures, phenomenal experience and,
given unending repetition, lay and linguistic concepts of language
(qua verbal pattern). Further, while science cannot rest on faith
in words, as argued by Sellars, Ryle, and Dennett (among others),
just such beliefs underlie the social order and, thus, our accounts
of human action. In tracing language to a symbolic-dynamical
symbiosis, much can be shown to draw on co-embodiment.
Accordingly, the core of the paper offers detailed description of
events during 750ms of dialog or languaging activity. Exploiting
a pico-scale, mother and daughter coordinate by using voice
dynamics that contribute to slower phonetic gestures (transcribed
as [a:bεne]). These dynamics connect phenomenal experience
of a wording with innumerable accounts of a verbal pattern or
second-order construct (that can be written “ah bene”). The rel-
evant praxis evokes a history of non-local events that gives each
party her own understanding of what occurs. My hypothesis is
thus defended by detailed description of how human observers
use the symbiotic nature of language. This clarifies what “goes on”
(at least roughly)–human actors make it happen. As languaging
beings, we use beliefs about language (and languages) based on
concerting actions and talk as part of living within themany scales
of time (Madsen and Cowley, 2014). In this way, people gain sub-
jective experience of temporality that enables culturally defined
time to be used in action and perception. Human cognition is
fundamentally diachronic.
LANGUAGE AND THE CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE
“Language is first and foremost a temporal process whose dynam-
ics and effects result from activity by two or more contextually
situated individuals” (Fusaroli and Tylén, 2014, p. 1). In viewing
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it as a temporal process, language is allowed to permeate the scales
of experience that bind people into a living meshwork that con-
nects verbal patterns, social resources (e.g., money) and acting in
ways that change the natural world. Much depends on coopera-
tion between people who re-enact culture by using, for example,
talk, texts, and output from language-machines. When relying
on digital systems, human interactivity links multi-scalar dynam-
ics to Shannon information. Importantly, computing depends
on probabilities and, as Taylor (2012) shows so clearly, human
talk also relies on statistical patterns. For Taylor, this confirms
that form-meaning mappings use a mental lexicon. Denying the
existence of a mental lexicon, the paper presents language as sym-
biotic. While disembodied concepts sustain intuitions and have
enormous pragmatic value, their basis lies in, not individual
minds, but using linguistic co-embodiment to grasp and sustain
wordings.
Reified cultural templates (“languages”) dominated 20th cen-
tury linguistics. This was because, just as people believe in tables
and trees, they believe that wordings correspond to abstract
objects (“words”). While having immense social and practical
value, any such approach relies on lay views of language, intu-
itions or, as Wittgenstein (1957) prefers, “agreement in judg-
ments.” In fact, like all folk beliefs, such views rely on reports
of multi-scalar human coordination. In arguing against reducing
language to a verbal aspect, I stress the use made of embodiment.
As with other human activity, language exploits sense-saturated
coordination: like colors or numbers, verbal patterns index highly
socialized lived experience. While phonetic gestures lack the con-
stancy of digits, like both these and color display, they use a
history of synergies based on interpersonal coordination. On the
view presented here it is precisely its amenability to description as
both embodied and phenomenal that renders language possible.
This is because, using appearances, grammatical, and statistical
aspects self-sustain as living persons pass away over historical
time. Phonetic gestures shape events that are lived as lexico-
grammatical, pragmatic and probabilistic. Like number, language
thus functions at a population level—in ways that change over
historical time. However, in focusing on how phonetic gestures
connect verbal constraints to linguistic embodiment, I stress how
language lives through people or, indeed, how verbal patterns
self-propagate through human coordination. This appears in a
scale where people draw on cultural products to co-construct sit-
uations and lived experience. Pursuing this, I show how social,
moral and linguistic products constrain movements by living
beings or, in the terms of the paper, linguistic embodiment.
A naturalized linguistics begins with acoustic and kinetic
measures—not reports about wordings (or “words”). Rather than
favor “signs” over “substance,” language is traced to movement.
Tracing the said to phonetic gesture, the paper presents 750ms
of talk during which a person utters [a:bεne]4. Analysis presents
4This moment of first order languaging was chosen for two reasons: first, its
striking inventiveness is relatively independent of what is said—a daughter
shows exquisite skill in trying to head her mother off her conversational path.
Second, for Cowley, the case exemplifies an utterance act that enacts meaning
directly as prosody begets prosody.
detail that shows why dialogical events are irreducible to inten-
tions, phonetic gestures or experience of a priori types. While
the intention is plain and [a:bεne] describes gestures made, the
speech is symbiotic: events arise as verbal pattern constrains
linguistic embodiment. Acting in a dynamic field, contribut-
ing to the flow of talk changes the layout of affordances. An
act of utterance is joint activity which evokes what can be
called linguistic “symbols.” In so saying, I echo Howard Pattee
(see Pattee and Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2012), who, as a micro-
physicist, traced language, computation and DNA to dynamics
constrained by “symbols” qua self-organized measuring sys-
tems. On this view linguistic embodiment co-occurs with self-set
control parameters. Yet, there is also a contrast between lan-
guage and computation/DNA. Whereas computers and cells are
self-managing (viz. they use phylogeny/metabolism and phys-
ical laws/human programming), language—and its symbols—
depend on living human beings. Linguistic embodiment, coor-
dinated action, speech, and hearing, is bodily movement that
connects up central nervous systems. Skills in linguistic action
arise as people couple control of airstream mechanisms, vocal
folds, and articulatory tracts with phonetic gesture. Individuals
act to connect metabolism with wordings and changing percep-
tions. As a result, skills in coordinating linguistic embodiment
become enmeshed with what is learned from speech—people
language by linking subjective experience with a grasp of the
impersonal.
All embrained species exploit what Alain Berthoz (2012)
calls perçaction. Action meshes with perception as, insepara-
bly, people actively perceive the world. In humans, however,
perçaction is transformed by language. Once utterance-acts are
heard as reiterating patterns (as utterance-types) people mesh
perçaction with experience of phonetic gestures (or wordings).
They perceive objects and hear what the folk call “words.”
The skills are learned; babies make sense of coordinated activ-
ity long before they make or track phonetic gestures. They
come to use vocalizations to manage behavior and, in behaving,
manage caregivers; they use rudimentary observing to manage
how parties act, move and vocalize. By the second year of life,
children co-construct “lived situations” and negotiate ways of
“going on.” In parallel to Berthoz, wordings open up obser-
vaction5. Talk-in-interaction exploits utterance-acts that prompt
multiple interpretations. In what follows, I focus falls on, not
what such acts achieve, but their embodiment. I show how
people use local control parameters (Pattee’s symbols) and,
without knowing what they are doing, evoke the linguistic,
moral, and institutional resources of a community. By so doing,
metabolism drives language. Embodiment connects the scales of
time as people attune action with perception in activities that
depend on coordinating finely regulated vocal and non-vocal
expression:
• As perçaction language is sensorimotor activity that draws
on/gives rise to rich phonetic memory (and its imagistic equiv-
alents).
5Didier Bottineau (personal communication) suggested this extension to
Berthoz’s (2012) work.
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• As observaction, language is sensorimotor activity that draws
on/gives rise to phonetic gestures (and their visible equiva-
lents).
Phonetic gesture no more reduces to phonetic memory than rich
memories of voice-speech-and-action suffice to explain verbal
pattern. An utterance act like [a:bεne] influences social behav-
ior whose dynamics also invite phenomenal experience (that is
amenable to verbal description). Indeed, emphasis on event-
experience symbiosis parallels Darwin’s (1998) observation that
language-expression is part-natural and part-artificial; in terms of
the Descent of Man (Darwin, 1989), the ability to moderate natu-
ral sounds co-functions with mimetic abilities or, in his terms,
imitation. Playing down both linguistic form and its derived
artifacts (especially, texts and text-like “systems”), I pursue the
Darwinian intuition by tracing verbal pattern to how phenomenal
experience uses linguistic embodiment.
Instead of reducing [a:bεne] to linguistic forms, its acoustic
and audible features can be attributed to the linguistic embod-
iment of Italians6 . Indeed, those familiar with the “bel paese”
will find themselves using this pattern of phonetic gestures in
acts of utterance7. From a distributed perspective, the gestures
that constitute [a:bεne] enact linguistic flow, a form of perçac-
tion that permeates Italian ways of life. While [a:bεne] can be
said unthinkingly, its uttering can also invite observation, con-
strual, and interpretation. In the conversation described, it serves,
in the main, as part of family events. By contrast, this paper sub-
jects the same event to analysis. This is possible because [a:bεne]
is symbiotic. It is at once:
• Rich phonetic (and visible) activity that is integrated in a family
conversation.
• The issuance of an actor-observer (a wording) that can elicit
observer-actor response.
Because an utterance act is symbiotic, [a:bεne] connects scales of
human action. It can shape affective flow, enact a relationship
and reflect on a person’s family roles. This is possible because,
6Nigel Love (personal communication) argues that, somehow, Italian speak-
ers share considerable knowledge about how verbal patterns (the second-order
constructs of Italian) are used. Use of [a:bεne] is, he thinks, inseparable from
whether the parties believe it consists in, say, one or two words. He and I dif-
fer on two parallel points: I claim that people are, at once, caught up in flow
and, at times, use observaction; he emphasizes deliberate speech and interpre-
tation. Accordingly, I emphasize that [a:bεne] is heard by tracking phonetic
gesture as part of whole-body experience; he emphasizes that, for Italians,
any instance of [a:bεne] evokes abstract units that pertain to a community’s
speech. For the same reason, Love makes no distinction between “wordings”
(qua nonce phenomena) and verbal patterns (qua constructs that describe
community practice).
7Bechtel (2008) offers a book length account of how the biology of cogni-
tion can be explored mechanistically. On a distributed perspective, the verbal
aspect of language is a mode of organization that constrains the workings of
bodily parts and the biocultural procedures that serve to insinuate language
into a range of resources (i.e., by linking face-to-face interaction to both texts
and various kinds of language-machines).
like airborne synapses (Steffensen, 2013), its dynamics contin-
uously enable and constrain how parties feel and act. Potential
meanings—and a wording—trigger and result in a flow of pho-
netic gestures. The projecting, speaking/listening and gesturing
of [a:bεne] is direct meaning making (see Cowley, in prepara-
tion). On a distributed view, [a:bεne] exemplifies sense saturated
coordination. In making and responding to an utterance act,
a mother and daughter are less concerned with construals (or
“form”) than the richness of coordinated whole-body expression.
At this instant, phenomenal experience frames events: far from
inviting interpretation, the wording triggers subjective anticipa-
tion. It is not to be described by non-local meaning but, rather,
by the particular sense it has for each party. While further dis-
cussed below (in Section How [a:bεne] Functions), far from
reducing to truth-conditional acts (see Oaksford and Chater,
1991), human action draws on essentially subjective probabil-
ity estimations (Madsen, 2014). Bayes’ theorem is a normative
description whose probabilistic estimations describe, not a brain’s
workings, but how a person anticipates. Linguistic experience—
and interpretation—thus builds on concerted embodiment. Since
subjectivity is inherently social, it has a central role in cognition
that extends beyond the body.
Subjectivity uses embodiment in all forms of perçaction (e.g.,
looking). Cognitive events such as those based on saccading
or looking depend on time-scales at and below awareness8 .
In language too, action uses concerted looking as affect links
utterance acts while setting off resonances and damping-effects.
Coordination links looking and talking as people establish con-
sensual domains (Maturana, 1980) or, alternatively, develop
shared discursive and other practices. In short, during coordi-
nated action, people also gain the skills of human observers. For
example, they may come to see the point of actions or, indeed,
to grasp the sense of various ways of displaying intentions and
attitudes (and the microsocial order). As a result, they share
beliefs about language: they picture forms and meanings as part
of the world. Concerting bodies while attending to wordings thus
links perçaction with forms (and concepts). Just as with monetary
values ormusical offerings, people draw on probabilistic informa-
tion. In an attested, mundane example, a suspect can reasonably
refuse to give a policeman information when he has admitted his
guilt. In these circumstances, not naming confederates is licensed
by the normative order (see Edwards and Potter, 2005). Since this
is legitimate and intelligent, the management of social roles must
be deemed “cognitive.” An observer draws on circumstances to
decide what he need not say. Much the same applies to the unsaid.
Since language is symbiotic, observers may focus on acting like
a policeman, speaking English or (not) sounding Liverpudlian.
The language flow is cognitive in that it affects the unfolding
of lived experience. Thus, as with refusing to give information,
a person may speak in order to sound educated: the cognitive
influences social judgment. Indeed, since practices link human
embodiment with the verbal, the artificial becomes social. As
8Emphasis on the pico-scale or how vocal and other gestures are made is char-
acteristic of the distributed view. Pioneered by Cowley (1994), the approach is
increasingly influential (for example, Thibault, 2011; Uryu et al., 2014).
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Hutchins (1995, 2014) shows, in settings like the cockpit, cog-
nitive events are dominated by slow processes. In Wittgenstein’s
terms, the cockpit links language games with forms of life as
pilots perceive aspects of the world. While cognition is enabled
by embrained bodies, cultural resources prompt meaning making
as an observer individuates what is important. By linking natural,
social and material resources, the products of past events change
later activity. A 4 million year history of self-directed representa-
tional acts (Donald, 1991) influences evaluation and learning as
people self-improve and cooperate. Human motivations induce
practicing and, thus, people gain fine control over vocalizations—
the grounding of musical, mathematical and linguistic extensions
to embodiment. The lived experience of language thus meshes
with beliefs and conceptual tools that arise in a community’s
praxis.
LINGUISTIC EMBODIMENT
Linguists link lay views with Saussure’s authority to build lin-
guistics on phenomenal experience of how phonetic gesture can
be transcribed. Invoking abstract objects (e.g., words, generative
grammar, conceptualization, or I-language), they invoke, not acts
of speaking-while-hearing, but abstract types (e.g., utterances,
sentences, constructions, usage-patterns). Emphasis on words
and rules thus divides the linguistic from the non-linguistic. By
fiat, sense-saturated coordination ceases to be language; linguistic
embodiment ceases to be linguistic embodiment. If acknowl-
edged, bodily dynamics are ascribed to modalities or paralinguis-
tic and prosodic systems. Conversely, on a distributed perspective,
language is sense saturated coordination whose neuro-social con-
straints sustain observing—activity in which wordings play a part
(Cowley, 2011b). It emerges from the synergies and movements
of linguistic embodiment that shape a flow of activity during
which both macro and micro constraints affects what people do.
People may speak and hear, for example, as part of a family: talk
coordinates action (and vice versa). Linguistic embodiment has
a role in constituting phenomenal experience that uses neural,
microsocial, and cultural constraints. It enacts social activity and,
paradigmatically, conversation. The claim is readily defended.
First, talk is of pivotal concern to most people. Second, conver-
sations ground skills that depend on language (e.g., flying planes,
seduction, hunting). Third, talk is almost certainly the basis for
the phylogenetic emergence of language—perçaction based on
linking airstream mechanisms with control of the articulators.
Not only is this a Darwinian view, but it allows cooperation and
cognition to derive from coordinated movement. As with dance,
music, and sport, language uses cultural and bodily constraints to
social effect. Although literate people picture language as it “can
be separated from its material expression” (Thibault, 2011, p. 2),
this dubious surgery strips it away from lived experience. By leav-
ing aside how people use utterance-acts, language is excised from
the ecology: it is forgotten that “thinking depends as much on the
environment of the thinker as it does on his or her brain” (Wells,
2006, p. 2).
Let us consider how co-activity draws on a single uttering of
what can be described as [a:bεne]. In offering a little detail about
these 750ms, I show two segments (see colons) exploit audible
pico-scale lengthening.Whereas the initial “b” is striking, the long
[ε] vowel is typical of the speaker9. For the speaker’s mother, the
latter is thus unlikely to be perceptually salient; further, letter-
spacing hints at other pico-scale timing (thus, “a h” is slow).
Moreover, while hundreds of measures could be reported, the
transcription picks out acoustic correlates of pitch on the first and
last measurable vowels [Cowley’s (1994); interchange (IF) and
enjoining (EF) frequency]. Finally, there is a marked fall on the
prominent syllable. (All measures are given in Hz).
a  h     b: e: n e
207
152
As part of mother-daughter “thinking,” the utterance-act binds
what precedes with what is likely to follow. Speaking [a:bεne] is a
“striking example of human inventiveness” (Cowley, 1994) where
discursive practice uses human musicality. While the initial pitch
(207Hz) is near the daughter’s norm (her mean IF is 215Hz) and
the prominent falling tone unexceptional (compare unmarked
“oh good”), the act is striking. The lengthening of [b:] is an
emblem of status that prefigures a “decisive” fall of half an octave
(on bene). Indeed, this drops from about the daughter’s mean IF
a full standard deviation below her norm (152Hz)10. Importantly,
her speech rate matches her mother’s almost perfectly: while her
mother’s rate is 240ms per syllable, the daughter’s is 250ms.
And, as emphasized in the Section “How [a:bεne] Functions,” the
“meaning” is also striking. Since thinking and social events are
partly constituted by linguistic embodiment, details show more
than sophisticated speech timing. Crucially, as phonetic gestures
attune to her mother’s voice, the voices create inter-individual
patterns. Once these coordinated dynamics are noticed, one sees
that, far from being paralinguistic, their musicality affects how the
parties act, feel, and verbalize. Thus, [a:bεne] is co-constructed
or, in another idiom, an other-oriented act (Linell, 2009). Human
dialogicality neither reduces to conventional use of form/meaning
nor to typologies of speech act. No “pure” linguistic or cogni-
tive model can show how mother and daughter coordinate. In
Levinson’s (1995) terms, this is interactional thinking: the sense
of [a:bεne] is enacted (i.e., not inferred from the context of “ah
bene”).
Although amenable to separate analysis, the so-called modal-
ities co-constitute speaking-while-listening or first-order lan-
guaging. Indeed, on the distributed-ecological view, interactiv-
ity shapes experience of talk. Its sense-saturated and normative
9While Lombard, the speaker usually uses a Northern version of standard
Italian which is striking, in part, for marked use of geminate consonants: as
a schoolteacher she often speaks in ways that contrast with the local dialect
(where there are no geminates). Her unusual lengthening of the “b” on “bene”
(as in central and Southern Italian speech) distances her from hermother’s use
of the dialect form “borsassa” (-assa is a widely used negatively charged suffix
that denotes large size).
10Detail is offered in a paper (Cowley, in preparation) that uses this passage to
show how linguistic embodiment (or first-order language) enacts directmean-
ing making. Details like those reported are ubiquitous in family conversations
(see Cowley, 1994).
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aspects enable bodies to coordinate peoples’ feelings, thinking,
and acting. Crucially, the dynamic field of experience involves
more than phonetic gesture. Even if one leaves aside visible behav-
ior, people use rhythmically based pico-scale dynamics based on
modulating the air stream mechanism while making phonetic
gestures. Saussure’s error lay in dividing form from substance
or, without argument, unzipping breathing from vibration of
the vocal folds and how a changing vocal tract constrains pho-
netic gestures. Linguistic embodiment exploits a speaker’s whole
body movements. Indeed, it is a scandal that phenomenal expe-
rience is often blithely assumed to confirm the “reality” of a
language-system. In ignoring linguistic embodiment, a focus on
“form” echoes Cartesian dualism and debates about “represen-
tation.” As a result, many 20th Century linguists ascribe lan-
guage to the mind—echoing rationalist or empiricist debate. The
radical nature of Chemero’s view of embodiment is that agent-
environment dynamics, not brains, become the basis of cognition.
Language thus begins with pico-scale sensorimotor control that
allows wordings (and inscriptions) to be derived from phonatory
control, movement, and phonetic gesture. Indeed, it is a simple
fact that people hear utterances as reiterations of the latter: given
motor skills, the brain is trained through re-use11. Repetition of
speech fragments in strategic social action attunes phenomenal
experience to the movements that sustain and echo collective life.
In lived experience, people thus draw on the past, invoke the
future and exploit the impersonal. As with mother and daugh-
ter, meaning-making is direct and idiosyncratic. Contra Lyons
(1977), language reduces to neither standardized, regularized nor
decontextualized forms. While such models highlight the half-
artificial, they overlook how bodies to move each other in a
pico-scale. In fact, as with [a:bεne], much uses what Abercrombie
(1967) calls voice dynamics, continuous phonetic fluctuations
that modulate the said. Prosody is thus redefined as “aspects of an
individual’s speech explicable neither in relation to word-based
forms into which the speech can be analyzed, nor as part of the
invariant auditory coloring that identifies an individual speaker’s
voice” (Cowley, 1994, pp. 6–7). As linguistic embodiment, mean-
ing spreads as people exploit pitch, loudness, pace and so on.
Like a cultural artifact or brain, human musicality serves as a
cognitive resource. People show exquisite sensitivity to voices as
they co-operate, talk, and manage emotion. Since voices serve in
action, the results shape joint procedures and, thus, social events.
In everyday life, dynamics connect wordings with circumstances,
history and what is manifestly heard. The symbiotic coordina-
tion of “language” derives from, not verbal patterns, but bodily
achievements: it is activity in which wordings play a part.
HOW [a:bεne] FUNCTIONS
Linguistic embodiment involves much more than phonetic ges-
ture. In presenting a single “interact” (Linell, 2009), the case
of [a:bεne] shows how phonetic gesture can be subordinated to
a pico-scale flow. However, it is also important to sketch how
11As multiscalar activity, language unites many kinds of network. It is likely
that, with skills in speaking, listening and otherwise drawing on linguistic
resources, people “rewire” or sculpt their brains as suggested by Anderson’s
(2010) hypothesis of neural reuse.
coordinated thinking draws on the richness of lived experience
(for more detailed description, see Cowley, 1998; Cowley, in
preparation). In what follows, therefore, I place how the women
act within a wider event trajector. In so doing, I use transcription
to build a narrative gloss:
M : Questi sono del tuo orto? M. Are these from your garden?
A: Oeu me ne ha dato A: Mmm, she gave me
un po’ a few did
la Rosa # Rosa #
ce ne ha dato she gave a
una borsassa ginormous bag to
la Palmira Palmira
M. Ah bene M. Oh good
Briefly, having asked if the peas they are eating come from
their garden, the daughter soon realizes that this is a mistake.
Her mother begins to launch into a lament—they are not and,
what’s more, she only got a few while, worse still, Palmira was
given a “ginourmous” bag of peas12. As the daughter says “ah
bene,” she attempts to control her mother. Thus, in terms of
content-pattern OH GOOD is anomalous: giving a positive spin
to events (“good that she gave you a bag”), the daughter seeks to
deflect a train of thought. At the same time [a:bεne] enacts how
she feels—affect permeates gesture, wordings, and facial activ-
ity. Crucially, the act thus depends on pico-scale voice dynamics,
the metabolic underpinning of language. It is in this sense that
the importance of the phonetic detail lies in how the daughters’
utterance-acts come to be suffused by her mother’s co-presence.
Broadly, the utterance-act is the thinking or, alternatively, speech
enacts meaning.
Many linguists focus on how a person can perform the same
acts over and over again. In prioritizing what Colunga and Smith
(2008) term the problem of stability, they reduce prosody to pat-
terns and, overlooking voice dynamics, emphasize discursive, and
intra-utterance regularities that are said to generate rhythmic and
tonal patterns (e.g., how tone groups map onto prominences
and patterns of pitch, duration, and loudness associated with
marked syllables). While said to be “communicative” (whatever
that means), models of prosodic systems are powerless in clar-
ifying function. This is because, in focusing on the recurrent,
they make pico-scale voice dynamics “paralingistic.” The mod-
els disembody language by separating it from experience. On
the distributed-ecological view, by contrast, the dynamics of lan-
guage flow shape how parties “decide what to say.” As shown
in fine-grained analysis, extensive use is made of rapid bodily
attunement, improvisation, and lived relationships. Indeed, this
enacts most of what we call emotion, attitude and how people
vary the deliberation (and inhibition) of social life. Of course, as
an embrained species, humans use learning and repetition; yet, as
observers, individuals also use particularities. Language exploits
interactivity or, for Colunga and Smith, dynamics permitting
us “to smartly do novel things that integrate the stabilities
12As noted above “borsassa” is a dialect form that gives negative connotations
to an object of some size. In order to render something of this, I have translated
it as “ginormous.”
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of past experience with the idiosyncrasies of the moment”
(2008, p. 175).
Metabolism reasserts itself as the talk continues through the
750ms during which the mother finds a way of going on. In so
doing, she pointedly pays no attention to the phonetic gestur-
ing. Far from speaking up on the positive, she speaks as if her
daughter had said nothing. Indeed, using the voice dynamics,
she redoubles her complaint. Far from relying on interpretation,
this is affective vocal expression: the parties co-enact flexible,
adaptive behavior that alters neural processes, sets up priors,
and shapes subjective experience. Not only do they know what
Everett (2012) calls “the joy of language” but their speaking and
moving is thick with sense. Phonetic gestures intermesh as peo-
ple take each other’s measure–sensing how they are assessed.
Interactivity affects feeling, thinking and acting in scales that
are more rapid than phonetic gestures and audible shifts in
tones of voice. While a micro-scale highlights what we articu-
late (syllables, tone-units/phrases, and utterances), much depends
on people whose resonating voice dynamics set off sound pat-
terns with variable probabilities13. Thus, attention shifts to func-
tions that characteristically occur in 50–200ms range: in this
pico-scale interpersonal synergies are ubiquitous. Living lan-
guage is grounded in, not wordings, but bodily movement. Of
course, linguistic embodiment is no more than a necessary part
of language—at times people choose to say, write and con-
strue things with much more deliberation. That too must be
considered.
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
There is nothing exceptional about tracing human activity to how
cognition emerges in ecological space and ecological time. Not
only is this also true for sport and dance but, not surprisingly,
it is also applicable to problem solving. As shown in experimen-
tal work, people use interactivity, sense-saturated coordination,
that mediates embrained bodies, motor actions and artifacts (Ball
and Litchfield, 2013; Vallée-Tourangeau and Vallée-Tourangeau,
2014). In talk, much depends on pico-scale dynamics (Cowley,
1994, 2010; Thibault, 2011; Steffensen, 2013; Cowley, in prepara-
tion). By implication, linguistic embodiment enables living sub-
jects and communities to use musicality as language arises beyond
the body. Next, therefore, I turn from lived dynamics to the non-
metabolic. The point is that embodied musicality suffuses what
are heard as physically-based patterns like “ah bene.” Pico-scale
events shade phonetic gestures as utterance-acts become audi-
ble as utterances of something. To repeat the mantra, language
is activity in which wordings play a part. However, one must be
careful: wordings emerge as those familiar with, say, Italian forms
of life hear phonetic gestures. While reported as linguistic types,
these function, not as “forms,” but nonce events. Like numbers
or colors, phonetic gestures are resources used in action. Indeed,
linguistic embodiment gains its power from managing how one
13Inmany species, Hinde (1979) informs us, much depends on both the prob-
abilities with which individuals do things and, at times, on how they are done.
Though primate grooming is the classic case, birds also exploit both micro–
and pico-scales–a clear case is that of how Alex the parrot taught himself to
say “spool” (see Pepperberg, 2007).
languages in ways that evoke a community’s speech patterns. In
distributed terms, second-order constructs (i.e., lexical, semantic,
phonological, morphological, syntactic, pragmatic, and stylistic
patterns) constrain what people do, feel and, thus, think. Further,
much of the time, of course, people act “mindlessly”: as a result
of a life-history, they adopt beliefs in the reality and power of
wordings. In literate communities, these become associated with
inscriptional forms such as “ah bene.”
As activity in which wordings play a part, language becomes
insinuated into almost all areas of human life. In more formal
kinds of talk, worship, text-messaging, for example, the verbal
dominates. Indeed, without skill in perceiving wordings, there
can be no human observers—and no language. In ontogene-
sis, skill in perceiving phonetic gestures as wordings arises from
experience of interacts (Linell, 2009). On a distributed-ecological
view, the perceptual skill arises in zooming out of a full-bodied
situation. Thus, while utterance-acts link metabolism to local
practices, they also come to be heard in a particular sense. While
these can be ascribed to intentions, this is a second-order model.
In the case of [a:bεne], it is a fact that, for Italians, the act
evokes hearings of “ah bene.” While further discussed below,
I stress only that prompts and probes exploit meaning poten-
tials (Linell, 2009). The daughter finds herself moved to stop her
mother: her polyphonic [a:bεne] links Italian ways of managing
conflict with a mother-daughter relationship; it enacts her con-
cerns, her perception of her mother and, indeed, a wish to be
“positive.” The holistic nature of [a:bεne] links neural synergies
with habit as phonetic gesture binds various time-scales into a
lived situation. As a chunk of behavior, its verbal aspect resem-
bles a real-pattern (Dennett, 1991; for development, see Ross,
2000). Functionally, the utterance-act triggers pattern recognition
that bears the hallmark of reward-based learning. Dennett (1991)
compares this with how von Neumann machines use zip files;
instead of applying a value to every bit of information, programs
use compression. By analogy, hearing [a:bεne] calls up senses
that may be valid. Voice dynamics constrain experience and thus
prompt anticipation. In the flow of talk, wordings—the phenom-
enal experience—index ways of proceeding. Just as a computer
needs users or a cell an environment, language demands an
observer. Like a zip-file, [a:bεne] evokes compressed information
if, and only if, a person finds a perspective from which the pattern
can be used.
Wordings exist as they are perceived. As phenomenal expe-
rience, they carry a particular sense which has little in com-
mon with either the meanings or forms that linguists ascribe
to verbal patterns (second-order constructs). Yet, as phenome-
nal experience, a wording calls up historically derived affordances
as embodiment and circumstances prompt ways of going on.
People use partial control over phenomenal experience to con-
cert their movements. As in music or dance, they jointly manage
how the rapid scale of linguistic embodiment resonates with
historical events as, in pico-scales, neurophysiology enacts coor-
dinated activity. The symbiotic nature of language thus connects
two kinds of reward-based learning. On the one hand, like rats
and wolves, people learn both individually and socially: they
use exposure, probability judgments and rewards. On the other,
people also use wordings in learning by observing. They notice,
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and prompt each other to notice, aspects of the world. They
use anomalies and turns of phrase; they pick up on attitudes,
intentions and hidden parts of the environment (e.g., urgency,
potential for use). Observation-based learning, it seems, is specif-
ically human. It enables the use of abstract qualities (e.g., bene,
red, strong) to connect the more intuitive to the more deliber-
ate in, for example, telling a joke or proposing another round
of beer. Phenomenal experience thus offers valuable ways of
gauging how to act in the circumstances. Although dealing with
[a:bεne] is largely a matter of co-embodiment, the example rep-
resents relatively automatic talk. On many occasions, human
intercourse depends on much closer attention to wordings. In
stories, for example, wordings dominate narration. In other
settings, they are even more basic—for example, they sustain
writing-systems.
Wordings can be used in literal, poetic and hypothetical ways;
in contrast to dealing with [a:bεne], people can choose to rely on
the “words that are actually spoken.” As argued elsewhere, much
can be gained by taking a distance from the flow of talk by focus-
ing on phonetic gestures and seeking to repress the unsaid. In so
doing, people learn to take a language stance (Cowley, 2011a).
While talk fluctuates between greater reliance on automaticity (as
in the 750ms of [a:bεne]) and more careful use of a language
stance, there are also intermediate modes of acting and attending.
People can and do shift emphasis between the said, what they say
and, indeed, the unuttered (“silent thoughts”). In its impersonal
aspect, language opens up other people’s experience (see Cowley,
2014). For example, if I allude to Endel Tulving, informed readers
may evoke mental time-travel: in its verbal aspect, the inscrip-
tion Endel Tulving compresses ways of going on. By opening
up an impersonal past (using “priming”), the reader’s embodi-
ment anticipates what is likely to follow. Skills connect automated
perception with how observers construe circumstances. Since
wordings draw on (or resemble) real patterns, particulars can be
perceived as types or “sames.”While real-patterns evoke reports of
hearing (and seeing inscriptions), they are equally likely to affect
how mother and daughter concert their speech. As they do so,
people enact and display experientially-based modes of practical
understanding14.
People use fine phonetic information to perceive, not an utter-
ance act’s particulars, but “salient” details that serve to anticipate
circumstances. In making rapid judgments about [a:bεne], both
parties use compressed information associated with statistical
experience. Far from using all available “information,” people
note sensitivity to unmet expectations (or expected standards).
As a result, combining real-patterns with voice dynamics (not to
mention movements of face and gesture) contrasts with deliber-
ate use of historically derived patterns.Whereas prosody is usually
managed by ear, observers can shift attention between the said,
14The Dennett-Ross view of real-patterns recalls Pattee’s symbols in that these
too are measures that constrain dynamics in observable ways. However, in
generalizing from DNA and computation to linguistics, Pattee views linguis-
tic symbols as brain internal. By contrast on the Ross-Dennett view, while
voice dynamics are public, cultural real-patterns (including wordings) evolve
in populations: they encompass language, traditions, music, money, etc.—not
to mention associated procedures and institutions.
the words that actually spoken, and how they hope to sound.
Wordings offer a degree of individual control: one can even speak
impersonally. While consistent with folk wisdom, psychology,
linguistics, and cognitive science are guilty of overlooking such
phenomena. Avoiding dynamics, they trace phenomenal experi-
ence to skills in monitoring the said, projecting what is likely to
be appropriate, and choosing how to “come over.” In turning to
the verbal aspect of language, as opposed to how [a:bεne] is co-
embodied, groups can be said to draw on a “systemic” meaning
potential (Halliday, 1985). Since this echoes the slow scales of his-
tory, to the extent that a subject grasps this potential, he or she can
use wordings to recalibrate acting, thinking, feeling other forms of
self-display.
Once language is recognized as symbiotic, one begins to
rethink the verbal. First, since perceived wordings can be repeated
and analyzed as parts and procedures, phonetic gestures allow
both skilled hearing and strategic use of utterance-acts. From
a distributed perspective, these shape perçaction—language is
skilled action. By implication, mechanisms beyond the brain
function as people use phenomenal experience to coordinate
activity. Language thus sustains the people of a social mesh-
work: the verbal aspect of talk uses a time scale where peo-
ple enact organized social practices (Enfield, 2011). However,
[a:bεne] also arises as a mother’s voice moves her daughter to
use cultural resources. Though hearing the same phonetic ges-
tures, each party reacts differently. Linguistic symbiosis allows
social factors to work through people whose interactions shape
circumstances, relationships and the Italian life. Thus, while con-
notational meaning is precise, both women draw on experience
of tens of thousands of similar cases: these constitute a fuzzy
denotational meaning (OH GOOD). At this moment, however,
this matters little. Events link the emotional interplay to cir-
cumstances and the mother ignores her daughter’s “positive”
move.
VERBAL PATTERNS ARE PARTLY SHARED
Since people have similar experiences, verbal patterns come to be
partly shared. Further, given rich phonetic (and visible) dynam-
ics, circumstances influence how people assess and manage each
other. In construing a single act of utterance, the women draw
on how countless hearings of phonetic gestures enrich experience
of both Italian forms of life and their relationships. In so doing,
they attend to what can be written as “ah bene.” This verbal pat-
tern can be described at the population or corpus level; even here,
however, it is not purely verbal in that, among other things, it
evokes attitudes and probabilities. In Italy, the pattern’s penumbra
thus sets off relatively predictable effects. When one experiences
a wording that can be rendered as [a:bεne], perception connects
up with scales of time and thus cognition beyond the body. Far
from using a shared lexicon, mental or social, the parties rely
on making and tracking phonetic gestures. Given the symbiotic
nature of human language, no more understanding is required.
Rather than ascribe a causal function to verbal patterns, they are
second-order constraints on lived experience. Like numbers or
colors, wordings link indices of past events to circumstances or, in
Maturana’s terns, trigger connotations. Far from using tokens “in
the head,” as (or like) real-patterns, wordings trigger events over
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which a person exerts some control. During talk, parties man-
age and inhibit their promptings, in part, by “choosing” what to
say. People rely on activity in which wordings play a part to grasp
and alter what they and others perceive, mean and say. Familiar
ways of speaking/acting and associated probabilities offer some
control over actions. The perceived—wordings, colored objects
or analog/digital “representations”– need do no more than evoke
an iterable pattern. Skills in conjuring up the audible or vis-
ible aspect of language thus ground what Wittgenstein (1980)
came to call “certainty.” Human modes of life, and living bodies,
enable one to make and accept utterance-acts such as: “My name
is NN” or “I have never been to Bulgaria.” Indeed, people can
even play philosophical games by making explicit judgments of
whether or not it is appropriate to say, “That is a tree.” Crucially,
such claims become transparent only to the perspective of an
informed observer: in themselves, they are trivial. It may be
true that a philosopher is pointing at a tree and saying what it
is and yet, at the same time, appear quite pointless to act this
way. If that is to be explained, human forms of life need to be
traced back to interactivity: one must show how people become
observers who, to an extent, share a perspective on phenomenal
experience. By hypothesis, this is possible because of symbiosis
between linguistic embodiment and the verbal. Utterance-acts
evoke wordings that, via phonetic gestures, allow people to con-
nect their co-embodiment with impersonal and shifting verbal
patterns.
Language is typically approached from an observer’s perspec-
tive. In the terms used here, a person takes a language stance by
attending to behavior, or products of behavior, that derive from
phonetic gestures. From this stance, language can be discussed,
re-described, formalized and, in slow time scales, transformed.
In history, utterance-acts change in parallel with conceptual evo-
lution. Slow events constrain how perçaction shapes individual
experience: thus, while non-linguistic “thinking” appears inmany
embrained species (see Bermúdez, 2003), humans use new kinds
of thought. Drawing on phonetic gesture, children hear wordings
and, eventually, develop skills based on the language stance. This
enables preferences to be connected with beliefs as children learn
how, in various settings, things are done. As a result, they can
develop ways of competing, coordinating and cooperating. They
may discover, for example, that the same phonetic gestures allow
a shirt, hair, or wine to be called “red.” In so doing, they gain
access to the concept’s impersonal aspect (“redness”); however,
like the taste of wine, the smell of hair and the look of a shirt, this
is also subjective. Whilst the phenomenal moors certainty, social
encounters permit a slow accumulation of conceptual under-
standing. Utterance-acts call up experience based estimations of
how wordings will be heard or projected meaning-potential. As
a person orients to others, they approach wordings as observers.
While influencing talk, they also elicit construals as, over time,
each person gains a sense of semantics. In the philosopher’s gar-
den, people match judgments by connecting well-timed pointing
to, for example, saying, “That is a tree.” Of course, philosophers
often erroneously seek to “explain” this referential relation. Yet, on
the distributed view, though languaging is subjective or connota-
tional (but not private), communities also exploit collective and
denotational meaning. As shown by the mother and daughter,
linguistic embodiment arises as concerted movements and voice
dynamics shape a flow of social events. In the case described, while
giving little attention to the words actually spoken (“ah bene”),
the parties re-enact their relationship–as only Italians can. It is by
virtue of the symbiotic nature of language that the parties grasp
value-labels (e.g., BENE/GOOD) that serve to sustain a cultural
lineage and, in so doing, a bundle of social practices.
HUMAN COGNITION AND THE SCALES OF TIME
The paper shows that, in studying cognition, one can ask how
embodiment functions. Applied to language, talk is seen as intrin-
sic to a history of interactions that connect sensorimotor activity,
brains, and forms of human artifice. As in the mother-daughter
exchange, linguistic embodiment connects parties across the
scales of time. In this sense, language is symbiotic or, simply,
linguistic embodiment connects movement with experience of
wordings. There are, at least, two reasons for which the claim is
non-trivial. First, symbiosis permits coordination between and
within individuals: as this occurs, the women relate to each other.
Using their voices, they concert expression and, thus, evokemean-
ing potentials that observers associate with verbal patterns. This
leads to the second point. An evolutionary history links phonetic
gestures with phenomenal experience such that wordings con-
nect subjective experience with an impersonal aspect. During talk,
people engage with each other and, to varying extents, use lan-
guage reflectively. By taking a language stance, they can contribute
to (or inhibit) debate about verbal and conceptual patterns.
Affect and whole-body dynamics thus link human vocalization
with impersonal experience that grants access to species-specific
resources. Given linguistic symbiosis, cultural products can be
re-used at later times (Hollan et al., 2000). In contrast to other
primates, members of homo sapiens sapiens link embodiment to
artifice as they shape relationships, institutions, and the cultural
ecology.
The polyphony of language not only grants access to language
machines and texts but it makes individuals part of a cultural her-
itage. People use this to draw on compressed information that
pertains to the world beyond the body. This arises because, like
zip files, phonetic gestures facilitate mental time-travel by calling
up both personal and impersonal experience. As Merlin Donald
saw, the evolution of a cognitive-cultural network transformed
human intelligence: it made it possible to create and deflate possi-
ble worlds Once verbal patterns are insinuated into embodiment,
language can self-sustain in a collective or population domain.
People live in language as they coordinate within a meshwork of
bodies that link ecological space with ecological time. Children
participate in distributed cognitive systems and, as Giere (2004)
insists, they do so as human agents. By hypothesis, human cogni-
tion is transformed as linguistic symbiosis allows them to develop
the skills of observers. Unlike other primates, the mother and
daughter orient to [a:bεne] and, in the space of 750ms, co-
construct a situation that re-enacts their relationship. Polyphony
enables them to act strategically and cooperatively. By hypothesis,
they use compressed Shannon information that is phonetic (e.g.,
durational), verbal (e.g., based on usage and discourse practices),
and conceptual (e.g., exploiting semantic attributions). Using
phonetic gestures, wordings sustain the ways of speaking used
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in Italian communities. Humans thus use cultural resources to
construct new kinds of temporal experience. It is because mean-
ing making is ecosystemic that, for example, astronomers can
explore the history of the universe. Further, as affective, interpret-
ing beings, people link embodiment with wordings. Distributed
systems enable living communities to build collective memories
and specify possible futures. Brains are recalibrated as people use
priors that sustain reasoning. Individuals become living subjects
as embodiment connects people within a social meshwork.
Humans are strange. In most species that use social learning—
rats, wolves, or elephants—collective intelligence centers on indi-
viduals. In humans, by contrast, much depends on an evolving
cultural or impersonal domain. This is because, while based in
embodiment, activity draws heavily on reports of how wordings
contribute to experienced phenomena. People connect perçaction
with skills based on using a language stance: they strategize, refine
values, and develop social practices. For this reason, acknowl-
edgement of linguistic symbiosis offers much to radical embodied
cognitive science. Mental content is replaced by treating language
as activity in which wordings play a part. People use embodied
coordination together with phenomenal experience of wordings.
They need, not neural representation, but dispositions that link
neural resources to the world beyond the body. Human intel-
ligence exploits diachronic agent-environment dynamics. Given
linguistic symbiosis, perçaction enables human individuals to use
wordings in observation. Individual lives can be regulated around
impersonal resources. Not only do we conform to social practices,
norms and beliefs but, crucially, artifice, and wordings enable
individuals to self-configure. As Heidegger saw, experience of lan-
guage makes humans distinct. As we exploit the accountable,
meaning potentials arise—people come to believe in languages,
minds, and mental content. Social life uses such beliefs, above
all, to draw on past—mythical, lived, told and impersonal. Its
imagined outcomes can thus be put to use in making futures.
This allows experience to be recalibrated as when, for example,
philosophers pursue enquiry by pointing at plants in a garden
while uttering variations on “That is a tree.” Remarkably, language
lays down markers for possible futures as people navigate ecolog-
ical space and ecological time. Drawing on interactivity, history
and wordings, each one of us becomes a living subject who, for a
moment, exerts some control over who and what we become.
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